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Summary. This paper compares the so-called gross and net architectures for secu-
rities settlement. It studies the settlement risk arising from exogenous operational
delays and compares the importance of settlement failures under the two architec-
tures, as a function of the length of the settlement cycle and of diﬀerent market
conditions. Under both architectures, settlement failures are non-monotonically re-
lated to the length of settlement cycle. There is no evidence that continuous time
settlement provides always higher stability. Gross systems appear to be more stable
than net systems.
Key words: Security clearing and settlement, gross and net systems, contagion.
Preamble
Manfred Gilli is a ﬁne man. Not only is he an excellent scientist and a per-
son of striking culture. He also inherited the physical leanness, the moral
robustness, the humbleness of the mountaineers of Su¨dtirol, his birthplace.
His unobtrusive sense of humor is second to none. Most importantly perhaps,
he is a profoundly gentle and kind person.
It is with a profound respect and friendship that we dedicate this paper to
Manfred. It has been a pleasure and a privilege to know him for many years.
May life bring us together for many more years to come.
1 Introduction
Securities Settlement Systems (SSSs) are institutional arrangements for the
conﬁrmation, clearance and settlement of securities trades and for the safe-
keeping of securities. They involve three steps. The ﬁrst one, trade conﬁrma-
tion, aims at ensuring that the buyer and the seller (typically both banks)
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agree on the terms of the trade. To that purpose, following a trade each party
sends an advisory message identifying the counterpart, the security, the num-
ber of shares, the invoice price, and the settlement date. After conﬁrmation
comes clearance, i.e., the computation of the obligations of the counterparts
to make deliveries or to make payments at the settlement date. Finally, set-
tlement consists of the operations by which the shares are transferred from
the seller to the buyer and the payments from the buyer to the seller.
Settlement systems may operate in one tier or two tiers. In a one-tier se-
curities settlement models all end-investor security accounts are within the
Central Security Depository (CSD). This model can be found for example in
the Nordic countries, Slovenia and Greece. In a one-tier system participants
settle mainly their customers’ transactions. In a two-tier system the CSD
keeps accounts only for the participating banks (or custodians) and only the
inter-participant transactions are booked on these accounts while the end-
investor accounts are with the participants/custodians. See Holthausen and
Tapking (2007) for an analysis of competition between CSD and custodians.
The participanting banks can settle the transactions of the end-investor in-
ternally.
The banks face a variety of risks, see Committee on Payment and Settle-
ment Systems (2001b). Among them, there is the risk that creditors do not
pay back a loan (credit risk) or that settlement is delayed because of shortage
of cash and securities (liquidity risk). There is the risk that securities are de-
livered but payment not received, and vice-versa (principal risk). Other risks
arise from mistakes and deﬁciencies in information and control (operational
risk), from the safekeeping of securities by third parties (custody risk), and
from potential failures of the legal system that supports the rules and proce-
dures of the settlement system (legal risk).
A ﬁnancial or operational problem during the settlement process may make a
clearing bank unable to meet its obligations. Default by a bank, in turn, may
render other banks unable to meet their own obligations, triggering a chain of
defaults within the SSS. In that sense, a SSS is susceptible to systemic risk. In
addition, SSSs are critical components of the infrastructure of global ﬁnancial
markets. Serious dysfunction at their level have the potential to propagate to
other payment systems used by or using the SSS to transfer collateral. Thus,
problems in the settlement process may induce systemic risk not only for the
SSS but also for the ﬁnancial system and the economy as a whole. See de
Bandt and Hartmann (2000) for a review on systemic risk.
Crucial characteristics of a SSS the timing and modalities of settlement. The
transactions can be settled in real time or in batches. In the case of batches,
the settlement can be conducted gross or net. Under gross settlement, the
clearing house settles the trades in the order they have been inputed in the
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system by the participants. Real time settlements can only be conducted gross
as Real Time Gross Settlements (RTGS), where payments are executed con-
tinuously via transfers of central bank funds from the account of the paying
bank to the account of the receiving bank. Under net settlement, each party
delivers at batch time the net amount it sold (or receives the net amount
it purchased) since the last batch. Netting is appealing because it results in
a very signiﬁcant reduction of the amount of cash and security that needs
to be available to the banks during the batch. However, a failure to settle a
trade leads to an unwind, i.e., to the deletion of some or all of the trades in
which the defaulting bank are involved, and in the re-calculation of the settle-
ment obligations of the other banks. An unwind imposes liquidity pressures
and replacement costs on the non-defaulting banks that have traded with the
defaulting one. Under these conditions, the system will almost surely fail to
settle if one or more of the initially non-defaulting banks proves unable to
cover the shortfalls and default. It is then likely that both the securities mar-
kets and the payment system will be disrupted. To mitigate this, a partial net
settlement is implemented in some markets. In that case, only the transac-
tions that cannot be settled are deleted in such a way as to reduce the overall
disruption. Likewise, real markets may implement a hybrid RTGS with par-
tial netting queuing. Such hybrid mechanisms make use of the so called upper
bound and lower bound on liquidity needs. The lower bound liquidity is the
net amount of sent and received transactions. The upper bound liquidity is
the amount of liquidity needed to settle immediately without queuing. The
diﬀerence between upper bound and lower bound liquidity is the diﬀerence
in liquidity needs between (1) a RTGS system without queuing; and (2) a
deferred net settlement system with queuing until the end of the day. If the
RTGS system includes a queuing facility and a netting facility at the end of
the day, it can use the lower bound liquidity eﬃciently during the day and
thereby settle some of the transactions with the same amount of liquidity as
the net system, but possibly earlier during the day. See, e.g., Leinonen and So-
rama¨ki) (1999) and Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (2001a).
The usual wisdom is that reducing as much as possible the delay between trade
and settlement improves the system’s stability. The rational is the following.
The longer is the lag between the date of trade and the date of settlement,
the greater is the risk that one of the parties will default on the trade. The
greater is also the possibility that the security current price will move away
from the contract price, i.e., the greater is the replacement costs risk. Both
the default and the replacement costs risks can be lowered by reducing the lag
between trade and settlement. Thus, the G30 recommended in 1989 that the
ﬁnal settlement of cash transactions should occur on T + 3, i.e., three busi-
ness days after trade date, and noted that same day settlement, T +0, should
be the ﬁnal goal to minimize counterpart risk and market exposure. See also
Leinonen (2003). Similarly, the International Organization of Securities Com-
missions (IOSCO) created, in December 1999, the Task Force on Securities
Settlement Systems. Amongst others, the Task Force has recommended that
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T + 3 settlement be retained as a minimum standard, but strongly suggests
that each market assesses whether a shorter interval than T + 3 is needed as
a function of the transaction volume, the price volatility, and the ﬁnancial
strength of the banks, among others.
Thus, there is a need to understand how the various type of risks are af-
fected by a shortening of the time between trade and settlement. Consider
ﬁrst the principal risk. It is typically taken care of by the Delivery versus
payment (DVP) practice that links securities transfers to funds transfers. The
settlement of securities transactions on a DVP basis reduces the likelihood
that the failure of a participant bank could result in systemic disruptions,
but does not eliminate it. If one party fails to deliver, the counterpart still
needs to replace the transaction at the current market price. The magnitude
of the replacement cost risk depends on the volatility of the security price
and on the time that elapses between the trade and the settlement dates.
As this time becomes shorter, the replacement cost risk becomes less and less
important. Moreover, the replacement cost risk has little systemic implication.
The credit and liquidity risks are mitigated in some markets by using a central
counterpart (CCP) that acts as the buyer to the seller and the seller to the
buyer. As previously discussed, most markets have also established central
securities depositories that immobilize physical securities and transfer own-
ership by means of book entries to electronic accounting systems. Because of
this mechanism, liquidity is usually not a problem on the security leg of the
transaction if short selling is not allowed. The cash leg of the transactions is
typically settled through the central bank payment system, as this has the
advantage of eliminating the credit risk to the seller. Furthermore, as men-
tioned earlier, intraday credit is typically available (possibly against provision
of collateral) to the banks.
In moving from T +n to T +0, which is the current policy target, the liquidity
risk becomes particularly important on the payments side because the in- and
out-coming ﬂows of payments are not known long in advance by the cash man-
agers. Gridlock may occur if the ﬂow of payments is disrupted because banks
are waiting to receive payments before sending them.3 By contrast, liquidity
is not a problem on the securities side because the custodians already have the
securities at the time the trade is conducted. Nonetheless, in some markets
the rate of settlement falls signiﬁcantly short of 100% because of human errors
or operational problems on the security side. Errors or delays may result from
3 Angelini (1998) studies RTGS systems under payment ﬂow uncertainty. He shows
that uncertainty, together with a costly daylight liquidity, may induce participants
to postpone payment. This aﬀects the quality of information available to the
counterpart for cash management purposes and may induce higher than socially
optimal levels of end-of-day reserve holding.
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the incomplete or inaccurate transmission of information or documentation,
and from system deﬁciencies or interruptions. Thus, a move to T + 0 and to
real time settlement could increase settlement failures on the security side.
The previous discussion hints that there are complex interactions between
the diverse characteristics of a SSS that have a number of implications at
the bank as well as, arguably more importantly, at the overall settlement
level. The Bank of Finland has recently developed a powerful tool for simu-
lating SSSs in encompassing, realistic settings, see e.g. Koponen and Sorama¨ki
(1998), Leinonen (2005), Leinonen (2007). Nonetheless, additional insight on
speciﬁc questions can be gained by investigating highly stylized, simple mod-
els. In particular, such simple models may help recognize salient aspects of
settlement contagion in Securities Settlement Systems.
The only attempt to study contagion in a simple model of a SSS we are
aware of is that of Devriese and Mitchell (2005). The authors focus on liq-
uidity risk on the payment side and study contagion eﬀects triggered by the
default of the largest player in a gross settlement system. They show that
large settlement failures may occur even if ample liquidity is provided.
By contrast, we investigate in this paper the implications of operational risks
on the security side which, as noted above, may become particularly impor-
tant as one goes towards T +0. We are not interested in the replacement risk
which, as noted previously, is not very important if the settlement interval is
short. Likewise, we do not consider the credit and liquidity risks, and do not
allow short selling. We use numerical simulations to compare, in a one tier
framework, the performance of pure net and gross settlement architectures as
a function of the length of the settlement batches. Speciﬁcally, we study the
eﬀects of increasing the number of intraday settlement batches when exoge-
nous random delays aﬀect the settling process. The delays are intrinsic to the
system and do not depend on the length of the batches or on the gross/net
arrangement. Then, a decrease in the length of the batches increases the likeli-
hood that delays will lead to settlement failures. We compare the implications
of these failures under net and gross architectures.
While the results presented here do not amount to an exhaustive study of the
behavior of a SSS under alternative architectures they give ﬁrst, and deep,
insights on the forces at work and on the complexity of their interaction. In
particular, they make clear that there is no simple monotonic relation between
the length of settlement cycles and failures, and that shorter batch lengths
do not necessarily improve the performance of a SSS. They suggest that the
gross architecture is almost always more stable than the net one.
158 Giulia Iori and Christophe Deissenberg
2 The Basic Framework
The stylized situation we consider is the following. A system of M tier one
banks trade S shares of a security among themselves. Short selling is not al-
lowed. Let’s T be the length of a trading day. Settlement operates at T + 0.
Trades are registered in a queueing system and settled for by a clearing house
in N intraday batches that occur at regular intervals. The N batches deﬁne
N settlement cycles of length Tn = T/N . Note that, for N large, the model
approximates real time settlement. The number of possible trades over a set-
tlement cycle is NT = MTn (M banks can trade on each time step).
Our analysis concentrates on what might happen during a settlement cy-
cle. The settlement cycle is sub-divided in time steps, smaller than Tn, that
represent the shortest time necessary for concluding a trade. At any time step
t = 1, ..., NT we randomly select a buyer and a seller. The seller transfers an
uniformly distributed random fraction of the shares in its virtual position,
that is, of the shares it would have if all previous transactions (since the last
settlement batch) had settled properly.
We assume that liquidity is always available. Thus, we consider only one of
two possible reasons for default, the incapacity of the selling bank to deliver
the shares on time, i.e., the security leg. The other possible cause, the inability
of the buying bank to pay, or cash leg, cannot arise. Within this framework we
investigate, out of all possible, one particular mechanism that could lead to a
default: The existence of an unpredictable delay τ between the conclusion of
a trade and the moment the trade is conﬁrmed and cleared. This delay may
be due e.g. to human or technical failure. Such a delay is always possible,
even if the all actors involved acts diligently and follows best business prac-
tice. A delay τ such that the trade cannot be settled within the current cycle
generates a triggering default as it can trigger a chain of subsequent defaults.
Indeed, assume that the trade that defaults was between seller A and buyer
B. The buyer B is not yet aware that the trade with A will default and may
sell the security to another bank C. Bank C, in turn, may sell the security
to another bank D, and so on, possibly generating a chain of defaults. These
induced defaults will be called contagious defaults .
Note that in our scenario a default results, directly or indirectly, from in-
voluntary causes only. It is not the consequence of a strategic behavior, such
as short selling for speculative reasons.
We use simulations to compare the two settlement architectures, net and
gross, previously introduced. In the case of gross settlement each trade is set-
tled at batch time in the order it has occurred. If a trade concluded at time t
does not settle, the buyer may be unable to settle a trade concluded in some
t′ > t, since the later was made assuming that the trade in t would be properly
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Fig. 1. Comparison of contagious defaults, triggered by an initial operational prob-
lem at time t0, in the gross and net systems.
settled. In the case of net settlement, all trades concluded during the settle-
ment period are settled together at batch time by netting the banks’ positions.
Only the bank’s net position at the end of the settlement period needs to be
actually settled. Thus, a default that under the gross system would induce
the buyer to default on another trade may not do so under the net system.
The functioning of these two alternative systems, gross on the left and net
on the right, is illustrated in Figure 1 with the help of a simple example. The
dots represent the banks, the links the trades, with the arrows indicating the
trade direction (from the seller to the buyer). The symbols tj indicate the
time when the trade took place, with tj < tk for j < k. Originally, the banks
A, B, and C have one unit of the security and the other banks have none.
Under both systems the trade in t0, plotted in both cases as a thick red link4
initially defaults. In the case of gross settlement, this initial default triggers
further defaults touching the trades concluded at times t1, t2, and t4, for a
total of four defaults (red arrows). In the netting case, by contrast, the initial
default at time t0 does not propagate through the system. Indeed, thanks to
the trades at times t3 and t5, the overall netting position of bank D remains
positive in spite of the default at time t0. Only one default, the initial one,
occurs.
In the case of net settlement, however, default is followed by an unwind.
The unwind causes (a) the deletion of all the trades involving the bank that
could not fulﬁll its commitments to sell, that is, the defaulting bank; and (b)
the recalculation of the settlement obligations of the non-defaulting banks.
Because the trades of the defaulting bank are deleted, it is possible that other
traders will ﬁnd themselves unable to settle after (b). This may trigger more
failures and thus more unwinding. The settlement process is completed only
4 All ﬁgures can be downloaded in color and high deﬁnition under
http://www.giuliaiori.com/SettlementFigures
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Fig. 2. Defaulting banks under gross arrangements (left) and under netting ar-
rangements (right) as the unwinding process develops.
when all remaining banks, if any, can settle, possibly after many unwinding
cycles. The eﬀects of the unwinding process are illustrated in the Figures 2 and
3, where the red dots indicate the banks that initially default, the green dots
those who can initially settle5. As could be expected, the number of banks
that initially default (Figure 2) is lower under the net than under the gross
system. Nonetheless, as the unwinding process takes place (Figure 3) and de-
faulting banks are removed from the system, more and more banks default
under the netting arrangements. In ﬁne, the number defaults is lower under
the gross system (75 out of 1319) than under the net system (356 out of 1319).
The advantage of the gross settlement system is that it is always possible
to identify and delete the exact trade that defaults. The disadvantage is that
the order of the trades matter. The advantage of net settlement is that the
order of the trades up to the batch time does not matter. This may reduce the
initial number of contagious defaults. Nonetheless, via the unwinding mecha-
nism, even trades that could otherwise settle are cancelled. This may generate
new rounds of contagious defaults. We study in the next section the interplay
between these two eﬀects.
5 The graphs were generated by simulating trading accordingly to the rules de-
scribed in section 3.2.
Systemic Risk in Alternative Securities Settlement Architectures 161
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 1213
14
15
17
1819
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11 1213
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
27
28
29
30
31
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
6566
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
12
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
24
25
27
28
29
30
31
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
89
90
91
92
93
95
96
97
98
99
Fig. 3. Defaults in the net system as the unwinding progresses (from left to right).
The ﬁnal graph shows only the trades that can ultimately settle.
3 Numerical analysis
In the numerical analysis presented here, N = 100 banks and S = 1000 shares.
The trading day has length T = 65536 time steps. Initially, the S shares are
distributed randomly among the N ﬁrms. Let Πi(t) be the actual position of
bank i at time t, and Π˜i(t) its virtual position. Initially, the actual and the
virtual positions coincide, Πi(0) = Π˜i(0).
At each time step t, a trade occurs with a probability λ. That is, a high
value of λ indicates a very liquid market. The trade is deﬁned in the following
way. A bank i sells a integer random number of shares si(t) ∼ U
[
1, Π˜i(t)
]
to
buyer j. The buyer is randomly chosen. However, the seller is with probability
p ≥ 0 the buyer at time t− 1. This introduces a structure in the sequence of
trades, unless p = 0, in which case the choice of the seller is purely random
and does not depend on past activity.
Note that si(t) ≤ Π˜i(t) does not warrant si(t) ≤ Πi(t). In other words,
the bank sells shares that belongs to its virtual portfolio. However, should a
default occur, its actual portfolio may be smaller than the virtual one and it
may be unable to settle the trade it realized.
A random delay τ between the conclusion of the trade and its conﬁrmation
and clearing occurs with probability μ ≥ 0. If t + τ > Tn, the trade is not
communicated on time to the clearing house and thus automatically defaults.
Otherwise it is communicated and the clearing house will try to settle it.
Following a trade, the positions of buyer and seller are updated in the fol-
lowing, self-explanatory way:
1a. If t + τ ≤ Tn and si(t) ≤ Πi(t),
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Πi(t) −→ Πi(t)− si(t), Π˜i(t) −→ Π˜i(t)− si(t),
Πj(t) −→ Πj(t) + si(t), Π˜j(t) −→ Π˜j(t) + si(t).
1b. If t + τ ≤ Tn and si(t) > Πi(t),
Πi(t) −→ Πi(t), Π˜i(t) −→ Π˜i(t)− si(t),
Πj(t) −→ Πj(t), Π˜j(t) −→ Π˜j(t) + si(t).
2. If t + τ > Tn,
Πi(t) −→ Πi(t), Π˜i(t) −→ Π˜i(t)− si(t),
Πj(t) −→ Πj(t), Π˜j(t) −→ Π˜j(t) + si(t).
In the cases 1b. and 2. Πi(t) respectively Πj(t) are not updated because
the trade will not take place due to a delay or to an insuﬃcient portfolio.
The trades concluded up to time step t for which t + τ ≤ Tn are stored
in a matrix J(t). The element Ji,j(t) gives the net position between agent i
and j at time t, as it will be known to the clearing house. If Ji,j(t) > 0 then
i is a net buyer from j. If Ji,j(t) < 0 then i is a net seller to j. Obviously
Ji,j(t) = −Jj,i(t).
We simulate the system, under both gross and net architectures, for dif-
ferent values of N , and average the resulting default rates over 10000 simula-
tions6.
Gross Settlement: Under gross settlement, the clearing house checks
all the trades in order of arrival. If at any t a bank i has committed to sell
a security it did not have in its portfolio at that time, i.e. if Πi(t) < 0,
the corresponding trade cannot be settled. Accordingly, any occurrence of a
negative position Πi(t) < 0 is a contagious default. In addition, a triggering
default occurs every time a trade is not communicated to the clearing house,
t+ τ > Tn, even if Πi(t) ≥ 0.
Net Settlement: Under net settlement, the clearing house is only con-
cerned with the ﬁnal net position ni(Tn) of trader i at the batch time. Not
counting the trades that were not communicated because of delays, the net
position of bank i is given by
ni(Tn) :=
∑
j
Ji,j(Tn).
If ni(Tn) is positive (negative), trader i has to receive (transfer) ni(Tn) stocks.
If ni(Tn) < 0 and Πi(0) > |ni(Tn)| the trade can settle. However, the trade
cannot settle if ni(Tn) < 0 and Πi(0) < |ni(Tn)|. There is a contagious default.
Banks who cannot settle are eliminated from the system and all their trades
are canceled (unwinding mechanism). Accordingly, if bank i e.g. cannot settle,
we set Jij = Jji = 0 for all j. Settlement is then attempted without the
defaulting banks by recalculating the new net position of surviving banks.
6 The C code for the simulations is available on request.
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Fig. 4. Default rate rd as a function of N for λ = 1.0, Na = 100, S = 1000, and
p = 0 (circle, black), p = 0.2 (diamond, green), p = 0.4 (triangle up, blue), p = 0.6
(triangle left, yellow), p = 0.8 (triangle down, gray) p = 1 (square, red) under gross
(left) and net (right) arrangements.
3.1 Experiments I
In a ﬁrst batch of experiments, we set the probability μ of a delay equal to 0,
construct a single default at the beginning of the simulation, and study the
induced contagious eﬀects as trading goes on. We slowly increase the value
of p (the probability that the buyer of one period is the seller of the next
period), starting with p = 0. For each value of p, we compute the average rate
of default rd, deﬁned as the ratio of the number of trades that fail to settle,
nf , over the total number of trades that occurred during the trading day, nT ,
rd :=
nf
nT
.
Figure 4 shows the outcome of these experiments as p and N increase in the
case of gross (left side of the ﬁgure) and net settlement (right side). One rec-
ognizes that under gross settlement the rate of default increases with p for
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
net rate of default
1
10
100
1000
pd
f 
 
Fig. 5. Probability distribution of defaults in the netting system for p = 0.2, λ = 1.0,
Na = 100 and S = 1000 and N = 1 (circle, black), N = 128 (square, red), N = 1024
(diamond, green), N = 8192 (triangle up, blue), N = 32768 (triangle left, yellow).
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any value of N . This reﬂects the fact that a larger p augments the likelihood
of long chains of trades. Under the gross architecture, this in turn raises the
likelihood of default contagion. Under the net architecture, by contrast, one
might think that the trade structure and thus the value of p are irrelevant.
Nonetheless, we ﬁnd that when N is large an increase in p leads to a higher
rate of default. Indeed, when N is large, the interval between batches is short
so that few trades occur between two batches, leaving little scope for netting.
Netting and gross architecture then behave almost identically. Note that for
N = 32768 only one trade can follow the initial one within a batch, for a
total of two trades. In this case the rate of default approaches 50%, as should
be expected given that the initial trade defaults by construction. When N is
small, a higher level of p implies a lower rate of default. That is, netting seems
to perform better when the trading bank acts both as a buyer and a seller –
a point that needs further study.
Under both architectures, the rate of default depends non-monotonically on
N . It reaches a clear minimum in the range N = 100 to 1000. In the net
case this can be explained in the following way. Since many trades take place
between two batches when N is small, the netting mechanism is very eﬀective.
However, if a bank defaults in spite of netting, the number of transactions that
are deleted via the unwinding mechanism may be very high. This is illustrated
in Figure 5 where the distribution of defaults is plotted for various N given
p = 0.2. For N = 1 (circle, black) the distribution is bimodal with two peaks
at rd = 0 and rd = 1. That is, either defaults do not occur or, if they do occur,
contagious eﬀects may aﬀect the whole settlement process. This explains the
abrupt increase of rd to about 44% as N decreases below N = 100. For N
large, on the other hand, netting is not eﬀective anymore. The default rate
rd increases with N since there is always at least one default, the initial one,
although the number of trades becomes very small. A similar eﬀect is found
in gross systems. In that case, the increase of rd as N decreases is due to an
increase in the length of the chain of trading. For N large, netting and gross
arrangements produce very similar results.
The average rate of default is always higher for netting system than for
gross systems except for p ≥ 0.8 and N small. However, this does not tell the
whole story. Consider for example the case N = 1 and p = 0.2. In the netting
system, no defaults occur in about 60% of the simulations. But rd = 100% in
the remaining 40% of the simulations. In the gross system, no defaults occur
in only about 17% of the simulations. In more than 80% of the simulations
about half of the trades cannot be settled. Hence there is no clear cut ranking
of which architecture delivers greater stability.
In Figure 6, we show the transaction networks for N = 1024 and diﬀerent
values of p. For small values of p the network is disconnected in several smaller
components. At the same time, the rate of default is lower in the gross case.
This is in line with the predictions of Allen and Gale (2000) who suggest
that systemic risk increases with the network connectivity. Nonetheless the
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Fig. 6. Transaction network for λ = 1.0, N = 1024, S = 1000, Na = 100 and p = 0
(top, left), p = 0.2 (top, right), p = 0.6 (bottom, left), p = 0.8 (bottom, right).
network structure is lost when netting multilaterally merges the positions of
each bank. In fact, in the netting case we ﬁnd that contagion decreases with
p at low N and increases with p at high N .
3.2 Experiments II
In this second batch of simulations we set the probability p that a buyer be-
comes seller equal to 0, and assume that a random delay τ can occur with
probability μ. We take τ = τM  where  ∼ |N(0, 1)| and τM is a positive con-
stant (qualitatively similar results were obtained with a uniform distribution).
A default occurs at time t if t+ τ > Tn.
We study the dependence of the default rate on the number N of intraday
batches. Reducing the batch length has the advantage of reducing the number
of parties exchanging any given security between two settlement cycles, and
hence, of lowering contagion. However, a higher N decreases Tn without af-
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fecting τ . Thus, a higher N increases the rate of triggering defaults generated
by random delays.
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Fig. 7. Initial default rate (left), total default rate in gross systems (center) and
total default rate in net systems (right), as a function of N , for M = 100 S = 1000,
μ = 0.1, and for τM = T (diamond, green), T/10 (square, red), T/100 (circle, black).
Top: λ = 0.01. Bottom: λ = 1.
We compare the average rate of default rd in the gross and net cases under
diﬀerent market conditions. Speciﬁcally, we let vary λ, which is a proxy for
liquidity; μ and τM , which measure the likelihood of operational problems.
Figure 7 shows the rate of triggering events (deﬁned as the total number
of triggering events divided by the total number of trades, left), the rate of
default under the gross architecture (center), and the rate of default under
the net architecture (right) for μ = 0.1, M = 100, S = 1000 and λ = 0.01
(top) or λ = 1 (bottom). The curves correspond to τM = T (diamond, green),
τM = T/10 (square, red), and τM = T/100 (circle, black). One observes
that the number of triggering events increases with N both for λ = 0.01 and
λ = 1. The gross rate of default increases with N when λ is small. For large
λ, it decreases with N for τM = T , increases with N for τM = T/100, and for
τM = T/10 it is ﬁrst increasing then decreasing in N with a maximum around
N ≈ 16. The net rate of default decreases with N when λ is large. For small
λ it decreases with N for τM = T , but reaches a minimum and then increases
with N for τM = T/10 and τM = T/100.
Figure 7 reveals that gross systems are little sensitive to contagion when
markets are illiquid. In this case the average rate of default is almost identical
to the initial rate of default (top, left and center). However, contagious eﬀects
can be signiﬁcative in the gross case when markets are liquid, due to the long
chains of trade that can arise in this context (center, bottom). By contrast,
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in net systems contagion can be very important even when there is limited
trading activity.
Further investigation is required to explain this rich variety of behavior.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we examined some issues related to the performance of diﬀerent
securities settlement architectures under the assumption of exogenous random
delays in settlement. In particular, we focused on the impacts of the length of
settlement cycles on default under diﬀerent market conditions. Factors such as
the market liquidity, the trading volume, the frequency and length of delays,
and to some extend the trade structure, were taken into account.
We found that the length of settlement cycles has a non-monotonic eﬀect
on failures under both gross and net architectures. This reﬂects to a large
extend the interplay between (a) the stabilization resulting from a decrease in
system defaults due to a shorter settlement cycle involving fewer parties; and
(b) the destabilization resulting from an increase in triggering defaults due
to the greater likelihood that a delay will impair a transfer. We also showed
that, contrary to a common wisdom, real time settlement does not improve the
performance of the settlement process under all market conditions. Finally,
under the scenarios we studied, the gross architecture appears to be more
stable than the net one.
The susceptibility of a SSS to contagion depends of many factors in addi-
tion to the institutional arrangements governing the exchanges. These factors,
that were not taken into account in this paper, include among others the topol-
ogy of the transaction network and the distribution of portfolio among the
banks. The impact of factors of this kind have been in part investigated in
the ﬁnancial literature using techniques from graph theory, for example in the
analysis of the interbank market. We are considering to do a similar analysis
for SSSs. First steps in this direction would be introduce heterogeneity on the
bank size, to simulate a two tier system, and to link the trading activity of
each bank to its size. In that way, bigger banks would possibly become hubs
of the transaction network, with important implications for contagion.
Another interesting extension would to take into account the possibility of
strategic default, i.e., of rational decisions by some participants not to settle
in response to movements in securities prices. Doing so may be particularly
challenging since, ideally, one should also take into account the behavior of
the operator of the SSS. Indeed, the operator typically attempts to discourage
strategic default by imposing a ﬁne aiming at taxing away any potential gain
from defaulting.
Albeit further investigation is needed to fully understand the complex
mechanisms underlying settlement risk in SSSs, we trust that the existing re-
sults convincingly show that the approach pursued in this paper sheds light on
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the behavior of SSSs that could not be gained otherwise, and may potentially
help improve their architecture.
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